Subliminal attention bias modification training in socially anxious individuals by Keren Maoz et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 23 July 2013
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00389
Subliminal attention bias modification training in socially
anxious individuals
Keren Maoz1*, Rany Abend1, Nathan A. Fox2, Daniel S. Pine3 and Yair Bar-Haim1,4
1 School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, Israel
2 Department of Human Development, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
3 National Institute of Mental Health, Bethesda, MD, USA
4 Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, Israel
Edited by:
Alexandre Heeren, Univesité




Jun Moriya, Rikkyo University, Japan
Cristina Mogoas¸e, Babes¸-Bolyai
University, Romania
Eva DeHullu, Open University,
Netherlands
*Correspondence:
Keren Maoz, School of Psychological
Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Ramat
Aviv, Tel-Aviv 69978, Israel
e-mail: kerenmao@mail.tau.ac.il
Anxious individuals demonstrate threat-related attention biases both when threat stimuli
are presented within conscious awareness and when presented below awareness
threshold. Nevertheless, attention bias modification (ABM) research has rarely utilized
sub-awareness protocols in an attempt to modify attention patterns and reduce anxiety.
Exploring the potential of subliminal ABM is of interest, as it may target attention
processes related to anxiety that are distinct from those engaged by supraliminal
ABM. Here we examined the effect of a subliminal ABM training protocol on levels of
social anxiety and stress vulnerability. Fifty-one socially anxious students were randomly
assigned to either ABM or placebo condition, and completed a pre-training assessment,
four training sessions, a social stressor task, and a post-training assessment. Results
indicate that the subliminal ABM used here did not induce detectable changes in
threat-related attention from pre- to post-training as measured by two independent
attention tasks. Furthermore, the ABM and placebo groups did not differ on either
self-reported social anxiety post-training or state anxiety following stress induction.
Post-hoc auxiliary analyses suggest that ABM may be associated with smaller elevations
in state anxiety during the stressor task only for participants who demonstrate attention
bias toward threat at baseline. Implications and future research directions are discussed.
Keywords: social anxiety, stress vulnerability, attention bias modification, masking, subliminal
INTRODUCTION
Numerous studies across clinical and sub-clinical populations
have found that anxious individuals demonstrate an attentional
bias toward threat-related stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). This
bias manifests even when threat stimuli are presented below
awareness thresholds (Mathews and MacLeod, 1986; Mogg et al.,
1993; van den Hout et al., 1995; Fox, 2002; Mogg and Bradley,
2002). Additional findings further suggest that threat biases
causally affect stress vulnerability (MacLeod et al., 2002; Mathews
and MacLeod, 2002; Eldar et al., 2008). Based on such obser-
vations, attention bias modification (ABM) treatments have
started to emerge, exploring the potential of computerized tools
to modify attention patterns and consequently reduce stress-
vulnerability and anxiety (Koster et al., 2009; Bar-Haim, 2010;
Hakamata et al., 2010; Beard, 2011; Hallion and Ruscio, 2011).
Clinical ABM trials indicate that training patients to attend
away from threat reduces self-reported as well as clinically eval-
uated anxiety levels (Amir et al., 2009, 2011; Schmidt et al., 2009;
Eldar et al., 2012). In addition, studies with non-clinical high-
anxious participants show that ABM training typically reduces
stress vulnerability in the face of lab-induced (Amir et al., 2008;
Bar-Haim et al., 2011) or real-life (See et al., 2009) stressors.
However, although many studies have utilized subliminal stim-
uli to measure preconscious threat-related attention biases and
their associations to anxiety and stress vulnerability (MacLeod
and Hagan, 1992; van den Hout et al., 1995; Fox et al., 2010),
the vast majority of ABM studies to date have used supraliminal
(i.e., consciously perceived) stimuli presentations to modify these
biases.
Exploring the potential of subliminal ABM is of interest, as
it may target a different layer of attention processes related to
anxiety. In line with this idea, brain imaging and psychophysi-
ology studies found distinct responses to readily-identifiable, as
opposed to masked, subliminal threat-related stimuli in anxious
relative to non-anxious individuals (Ohman and Soares, 1994;
Etkin et al., 2004; Li et al., 2007; Tsunoda et al., 2008). These
findings suggest that hypersensitivity to threat in anxious indi-
viduals may occur prior to conscious awareness. For example,
Etkin et al. (2004) demonstrated that supraliminal and sublim-
inal presentations of threat faces modulated neural activation in
distinct regions of the amygdala. Specifically, subliminal presenta-
tionsmodulated activity in the basolateral region of the amygdala,
and this activation was positively correlated with trait anxiety.
Thus, subliminal ABM may provide an opportunity to intervene
with anxiety-maintaining mechanisms that act very early in the
processing stream.
To our knowledge only one study used subliminal presenta-
tions in the context of ABM. MacLeod et al. (2002; study 1)
used a dot-probe task to train non-anxious students to attend
either to threat or neutral words. A single-session protocol with
576 active training trials was used, in which half of the tri-
als were presented subliminally and half were presented well
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within conscious awareness. In addition, 96 attention bias mea-
surement trials were intermixed throughout the active training
trials. Half of these measurement trials were subliminally pre-
sented and the other half were presented within conscious aware-
ness. Following training, lower stress vulnerability was found
in the group trained to attend away from threat relative to the
group trained to attend toward threat. The results also indi-
cated that attentional changes following training emerged only
for consciously presented measurement trials and not for sub-
liminal measurement trials. However, because all trial types (sub-
liminal, supraliminal; training, measurement) were presented
in a mixed fashion, conclusive inference on the specific effect
of subliminal training was complicated. Moreover, as men-
tioned, this study included only non-anxious participants. It
has been previously demonstrated that non-anxious individu-
als’ attention is less reactive to subliminal threatening stimuli
as compared to anxious individuals (Mathews and MacLeod,
1986; Mogg et al., 1993). This could suggest a possible expla-
nation as to why no change in preconscious attention pro-
cesses was demonstrated following training among these non-
anxious subjects. Finally, the study by MacLeod et al. (2002)
used word stimuli that might be less optimal than evolutionary-
relevant threat, such as faces (Ohman and Mineka, 2001), for
early threat-attention modification processes. Thus, it appears
that more research is needed to explore the effects of sublim-
inal ABM on anxiety and stress vulnerability among anxious
individuals.
The aim of the current study was to examine the efficacy of
a subliminal dot-probe ABM protocol on attention bias, anx-
iety levels, and stress vulnerability in a group of undergrad-
uate students with high levels of self-reported social anxiety.
We decided to focus on socially anxious individuals for sev-
eral reasons: first, for methodological reasons, we wanted to
keep our sample as homogenous as possible with respect to the
nature of their anxiety. This enabled us to specify the stim-
uli and the stressful manipulation to the characteristics of this
particular anxiety. Second, we selected this specific population
because previous findings indicate ABM efficacy with supralim-
inal presentations in clinically diagnosed Social Anxiety Disorder
patients (Amir et al., 2009; Schmidt et al., 2009; Heeren et al.,
2011, 2012), as well as in analog samples with moderate to
high self-reported social anxiety (Amir et al., 2008; Klumpp and
Amir, 2010). The subliminal ABM protocol used in the cur-
rent study followed the parameters from these previous supral-
iminal ABM studies, which have demonstrated positive effects
of ABM in socially anxious populations (Amir et al., 2008,
2009; Schmidt et al., 2009), but with subliminal presentations.
We expected the subliminal ABM protocol to change threat-
related attention patterns in accord with the training condition.
That is, that participants trained to attend away from threats
would show a reduction in threat-related attention bias follow-
ing ABM. No change in attention pattern was expected in the
placebo control condition which was not intended to manipu-
late attention. We also expected that participants in the ABM
condition will display less anxiety and lower stress vulnerability




Sixty socially anxious undergraduate students were invited to par-
ticipate in the study based on their high total scores (>30) on
the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS, Liebowitz, 1987) com-
pleted in a mass survey at the beginning of the academic year. A
cutoff score of 30 was found to provide the best balance between
false positive and false negative diagnostic errors in classifying
individuals with social anxiety disorder (Mennin et al., 2002;
Rytwinski et al., 2009). The LSAS was again administered to these
60 students in the lab during the pre-assessment session of the
study to verify high social anxiety levels. Eight students reported
lower levels of social anxiety relative to their initial report and
no longer met the criterion of LSAS >30. These students were
thus excluded from further participation in the study. An addi-
tional student decided not to participate. Thus, 51 participants
(mean age = 22.70 years, SD = 1.65; 41 females) were randomly
assigned to either an ABM group (n = 24) or a placebo control
group (n = 27). The mean LSAS score for the final sample was
55.73 (SD = 16.90), placing their mean score more than 3 stan-
dard deviations above the mean for individuals with no axis I
diagnosis (Fresco et al., 2001). The groups did not differ in age,
gender distribution, baseline threat bias scores, and mean LSAS
scores, all ps > 0.15 (see Table 1 for baseline means and SDs by
group, and Figure 1 for a CONSORT diagram). The study was
approved by the institutional review board. Participants provided
signed informed consent.
QUESTIONNAIRES
Social anxiety was assessed with the LSAS (Liebowitz, 1987). This
scale consists of 24 items describing social interactions and per-
formance situations. The LSAS possesses strong psychometric
properties (Fresco et al., 2001). The Hebrew version of the LSAS
was found valid and reliable (Levin et al., 2002). Cronbach’s alpha
in the current sample was 0.90 and 0.93 for the baseline and
post-ABM/Placebo sessions, respectively.
State anxiety wasmeasured with the state sub-scale (STAI-S) of
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI, Spielberger et al., 1983).
The STAI-S consists of 20 items measuring current, situational
levels of anxiety. The Hebrew version of the STAI was found valid
and reliable (Teichman and Melinic, 1979). Cronbach’s alpha in
the current sample was 0.89 or higher in each of the STAI-S
administrations (baseline, pre and during the stressor task, and
at post measurement).
ATTENTIONAL BIAS ASSESSMENT
The dot probe task
The sequence of events on a dot-probe trial is described in
Figure 2. Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation
display (500ms; white cross 1 × 1 cm), on which the partici-
pants were requested to focus their gaze. The fixation display
was followed by a presentation of a pair of faces. Face pairs
comprised either disgust-neutral or neutral-neutral facial expres-
sions of the same actor. Pictures of eight different actors were
used (four female), taken from a standardized set of emotional
expressions (Matsumoto and Ekman, 1988). Each face pho-
tograph was placed on a gray square background subtending
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Table 1 | Means and SDs of baseline, post-training, pre-stressor, and during-stressor measurements by group∗ .
Baseline Post-training
ABM Placebo-Control ABM Placebo-Control
Gender (F/M) 20/4 20/6
Age 22.96 (1.94) 22.42 (1.33)
LSAS score 54.67 (14.55) 55.96 (18.99) 53.63 (16.88) 54.62 (21.28)
STAI-S score 38.00 (10.80) 38.35 (7.92) 34.59 (9.28) 38.54 (9.50)
DOT-PROBE
Mean RT—threat 527 (63) 533 (47) 478 (44) 470 (39)
Mean RT—neutral 527 (58) 532 (50) 479 (40) 469 (33)
Threat bias score 0.10 (19) −0.88 (18) 1.01 (18) −0.97 (17)
AFFECTIVE SPATIAL CUING
Mean RT—threat valid 585 (92) 565 (69) 556 (79) 542 (56)
Mean RT—neutral valid 582 (94) 562 (70) 559 (76) 542 (59)
Mean RT—threat invalid 659 (118) 666 (98) 636 (106) 646 (84)
Mean RT—neutral invalid 675 (146) 664 (92) 635 (102) 647 (89)
Threat engagement −3.06 (23) −2.35 (22) 3.59 (22) −0.49 (20)
Threat disengagement −16.04 (54) 1.52 (40) 0.74 (36) −0.83 (37)
Pre-stressor During-stressor
ABM Placebo-Control ABM Placebo-Control
STAI-S score 38.29 (10.19) 40.27 (10.85) 49.84 (9.75) 52.73 (10.49)
*No between-group differences were found at baseline, post-training, pre-stressor or during-stressor, all ps > 0.10.
LSAS is Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale, STAI-S is Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-State.
50mm in width and 37.5mm in height. The face photographs
were presented with equal distance from the top and bottom
of the fixation cross, with a distance of 15mm between them.
The top photograph was positioned 30mm from the top edge
of the screen. The faces were displayed for 17ms and were
then masked by a pair of scrambled neutral faces displayed
for 68ms (see Mogg and Bradley, 2002 for a similar masking
procedure). After the masking disappeared, a target probe con-
sisting of either the letter E or F (font Arial, size 14, bold)
appeared at the location previously occupied by one of the
masks, and remained on the screen until response. Participants
had to determine which of the letters appeared by pressing
one of two pre-specified buttons on a mouse. The task com-
prised 128 trials of disgust-neutral pairs and 32 trials of neutral-
neutral pairs, for a total of 160 trials, displayed in a random
order.
The 128 disgust-neutral trials were counterbalanced with
regard to actor identity, disgusted face location (top, bottom),
probe location (top, bottom), and probe type (E, F). Attention
bias for each participant was calculated by subtracting the mean
RT of trials in which the target probe appeared at the disgust
face location from the mean RT of trials in which the target
appeared at the neutral face location. Positive scores reflect a bias
toward threat (threat vigilance), whereas negative scores reflect an
attentional bias away from threat (threat avoidance). On neutral–
neutral trials target location and type were fully counterbalanced
and RTs from these trials were not included in attention bias
calculation.
The affective spatial cueing task
Assessing attention bias using the dot-probe task following ABM
may reflect only near transfer of the training effect since it
relies on the same task demands and stimuli as the ABM train-
ing itself. To further test for generalization of potential changes
in threat attendance as a function of ABM, we used an affec-
tive variant of Posner’s spatial cueing task (Stormark et al.,
1995; Fox et al., 2001, 2002). In Posner’s original task (Posner,
1980), a cue appears in one of two locations, and is followed
by a target at the cued location on a majority of the trials
(valid cue) and at the alternative location on a minority of
the trials (invalid cue). Speeding on valid trials is attributed to
the benefits of attentional engagement with the cued location.
Slowing on invalid trials is associated with the costs of hav-
ing to disengage attention from the cued location. Systematic
manipulation of the emotional content of cues reveals the effect of
cue valence on attention. Studies using this task typically report
increased dwelling time on threat invalid cues relative to neu-
tral invalid cues, in anxious relative to non-anxious individuals
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007). This is thought to reflect a difficulty
in disengaging attention from threat among anxious individuals.
To test for far transfer of training effects we used the emo-
tional spatial cuing task in addition to the dot-probe task and
also used different stimuli (angry faces rather than disgusted
faces). Both disgust and anger expressions constitute threatening
cues to socially anxious individuals, and attentional vigilance for
both types of stimuli was demonstrated in this population (e.g.,
Mogg et al., 2004; Pishyar et al., 2004). Here, the emotional cues
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 389 | 3
Maoz et al. Subliminal ABMT in social anxiety
FIGURE 1 | CONSORT diagram and sequence of events in the study.
FIGURE 2 | Sequence of events in a subliminal dot-probe trial.
consisted of face photographs of 16 different actors (8 females)
taken from the NimStim stimulus set (Tottenham et al., 2009).
Two pictures of each actor were selected depicting an angry and
a neutral expression. The target was an arrow pointing either
up or down. Participants had to determine the arrow’s direc-
tion by pressing one of two pre-specified buttons on a mouse.
Cue and target stimuli were presented inside two dark gray boxes
(50mm × 65mm) which were displayed continuously to the left
and the right of the screen center. Each trial was initiated by a fix-
ation cross presented in the center of the screen for 500ms. Then,
the cue was presented either in the left or right box for 17ms,
and immediately masked by a scrambled neutral face displayed
for 68ms. The target arrow then appeared in either the same
box as the cue (valid trials) or the opposite box (invalid trials)
and remained on the screen until response. The task comprised
192 trials of which 75% were valid and 25% were invalid. Within
each type of trial (valid/invalid), cue type (neutral/angry), target
location (left/right), and target type (pointing up/pointing down)
were fully counterbalanced. Throughout the task each actor’s
photographs appeared a total of 12 times—6 times with an angry
expression and 6 times with a neutral expression. Threat engage-
ment was calculated as mean RT for valid neutral trials minus
mean RT for valid threat trials. Positive engagement scores reflect
attentional bias toward threat (threat engagement), whereas nega-
tive engagement scores reflect an attentional bias away from threat
(threat avoidance). Threat disengagement was calculated as mean
RT for invalid threat trials minus mean RT for invalid neutral
trials. Positive disengagement scores are considered to reflect a
difficulty in disengaging attention from threat stimuli.
ATTENTIONBIAS MODIFICATION (ABM)
The ABM version of the dot-probe task displayed the same stim-
uli as those used for threat bias assessment except that target
probes (E, F) appeared only at the location previously occupied
by neutral faces with the aim of implicitly establishing these as a
predictive cue for the location of the probe. The placebo control
group received the same number and type of trials as the ABM
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group but in a fully counterbalanced manner as was done dur-
ing threat bias assessment. Thus, no attention modification was
expected in the placebo control group.
VISUAL MASKING EFFICACY TEST
To ensure that participants were not consciously aware of the
emotional valence of the masked faces, an objective detection
task was used (Merikle et al., 2001). This two-alternative forced
choice task comprised 32 trials. Stimuli were pairs of identi-
cal face pictures (i.e., two neutral faces or two disgusted faces)
taken from those presented in the assessment version of the dot-
probe task. In each trial, a face pair was presented and masked
in the same manner as in the dot-probe task. Participants were
told that half of the trials contain a pair of identical faces fea-
turing a negative valence, whereas the other half contains a pair
of identical neutral faces, and had to indicate via button press
whether the faces in each trial were “neutral” or “negative.” A
95% confidence interval was calculated to reflect chance level
performance.
SOCIAL STRESS INDUCTION TASK
The social stress induction task was similar to the one used by
Amir et al. (2008). Participants were asked to choose one of three
discussion topics (using nuclear energy to produce electricity,
school uniform, or toll roads) and prepare a 5-minute speech
concerning claims in favor of and against the selected topic.
Participants were informed that their speech would be videotaped
and later evaluated for quality by the research staff. During the
speech task an unfamiliar male experimenter was present in the
room, provided instructions, and operated the video camera.
PROCEDURE
Over a period of five weeks, participants completed a base-
line assessment session, four attention training/placebo sessions,
a stress induction session, and a final evaluation session (see
CONSORT diagram Figure 1). The baseline assessment session
lasted 25min during which participants completed the STAI-S,
LSAS, and the dot-probe and affective spatial cueing tasks. All
computerized tasks were run in a darkened room, on a 17-inch-
screen laptop computer (Lenovo R61i), using E-Prime software.
Participants were seated at a viewing distance of 80 cm from the
monitor. Following the assessment session participants received
four training sessions according to their group assignment (two
sessions on nonconsecutive days per week, over two weeks). Each
training session lasted approximately 10min. The sixth session,
conducted 4–7 days following the last training session, was ded-
icated to testing the effects of ABM on stress vulnerability using
the social stress induction task. This session took place in a dif-
ferent room than the room of the training sessions. The male
experimenter administering this session was unfamiliar to the
participants and blind to all aspects and purposes of the study.
Participants completed the STAI-S in a waiting room. The exper-
imenter then invited participants to enter the testing room where
the social stress procedure was conducted. Following 5min of
speech preparation participants were asked to step up to a marked
spot in front of the camera and deliver their speech. Two minutes
into their speech, the experimenter temporarily paused the task
and asked participants to complete the STAI-S again. The exper-
imenter made it clear that the speech will be resumed shortly
after completion of the questionnaire. Following one additional
minute of speech participants were halted and thanked. Stress
vulnerability was indexed as the change between pre- and during-
stressor STAI-S. The seventh and final session was held in the
following week and took place in the same room as the train-
ing sessions. Each participant performed the same dot-probe and
affective spatial cueing tasks as in the baseline session. Then, par-
ticipants completed the test of visual masking efficacy followed by
completion of the LSAS and the STAI-S.
DATA ANALYSIS
Trials with RTs shorter than 150ms or longer than 2000ms, or
incorrect response were excluded. Then, for each participant,
mean RT per trial type was calculated, and trials with RTs devi-
ating by more than 2.5 SDs from the mean were further excluded.
This resulted in the removal of an average of 6% of all trials per
participant.
The effect of subliminal ABM on attention was assessed for
bias scores on the dot-probe task and for RTs in the affective spa-
tial cueing task. Dot-probe attention bias scores were subjected to
a 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with Group (ABM, placebo)
as a between-subjects factor and Time (baseline, post-training)
as a repeated within-subject factor. Response times on the affec-
tive spatial cueing task were submitted to a 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA
with Group (ABM, placebo) as a between-subjects factor, and
Time (baseline, post-training), Cue Validity (valid, invalid), and
Cue Valence (threat, neutral) as repeated within-subject factors.
To examine the effect of subliminal ABMon trait social anxiety
levels, total social anxiety scores from the LSAS were submitted
to a 2 × 2 ANOVA with Group (ABM, placebo) as a between-
subjects factor and Time (baseline, post-training) as a repeated
within-subject factor. To examine the effect of subliminal ABM
on vulnerability to social stress, a repeated-measures ANOVAwas
conducted on STAI-S scores before and during- the stressor task.
Group (ABM, placebo) served as a between-subjects factor and
Stressor-Phase (pre-stressor, during-stressor) served as a repeated
within-subject factor.
Because recent studies suggest that baseline attention bias
toward threat may predict supraliminal ABM training efficacy
(Amir et al., 2011), as well as cognitive-behavioral treatment effi-
cacy (Waters et al., 2012), we explored this possibility in the
current subliminal ABM study. We conducted two post-hoc analy-
ses to test whether baseline vigilance or avoidance (attention bias
toward or away from threat) modulated the effect of subliminal
ABM on social anxiety and stress vulnerability. First, following
Waters et al. (2012), we divided the participants to two groups
based on whether they had a bias toward threat (“attenders,”
attention bias> 0; n = 29) or a bias away from threat (“avoiders,”
attention bias < 0; n = 21) at baseline. This new dichotomous
variable was entered as an additional between-subjects factor in
the above described primary ANOVAs. Second, following Amir
et al. (2011), we regressed baseline attention bias as a continuous
predictor, along with training group (ABM/Placebo) (step 1) and
their interaction term (step 2) on state anxiety (STAI-S) change
score from pre- to during the stress induction episode. The same
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regression model was also applied to change in trait social anxiety
(LSAS) from pre- to post ABM/Placebo.
RESULTS
VISUAL MASKING EFFICACY TEST
All participants but one performed the task at chance level
(mean = 50.12% correct, SD = 8.12), indicating that the mask-
ing procedures were effective and that participants were unaware
of the affective valence of the faces. One participant had an above-
threshold accuracy performance (72% correct). All the analyses
reported exclude the data from this participant. When analyses
were conducted including this particular subject, no changes were
noted in the results pattern.
BASELINE MEASUREMENTS
Means and SDs for LSAS, STAI-S, and RTs and bias scores on
the dot-probe and affective spatial cueing tasks at baseline by
training condition are provided in Table 1 (left panel). None
of these measures significantly differed between the ABM and
Placebo-Control groups (all ps > 0.19). Attention bias in the dot
probe task as well as engagement and disengagement biases in the
affective spatial cueing task were not significantly different than
zero neither in the ABM group nor in the Control group (all
ps> 0.15).
POST-TRAININGMEASUREMENTS
Means and SDs for LSAS, STAI-S, and RTs and bias scores on
the dot-probe and affective spatial cueing tasks at post-training
by training condition are provided in Table 1 (right panel).
Change in attention threat bias
Dot-probe. This analysis yielded no significant main or interac-
tion effects, indicating no detectable changes in attention bias
scores from pre- to post-training, all ps> 0.68.
Affective spatial cuing task. RTs to invalidly cued trials were
longer than RTs to validly cued trials reflecting the classic Posner
validity effect, F(1, 48) = 187.13, p < 0.0001, η2p = 0.80. In addi-
tion, a main effect of Time was found, reflecting faster overall RTs
following ABM/Placebo, F(1, 48) = 6.39, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.12. No
other main or interaction effects reached statistical significance.
Trait social anxiety (LSAS)
This analysis yielded no significant main or interaction effects,
indicating that subliminal ABM did not affect self-reported trait
social anxiety (LSAS), all ps> 0.41.
Social stress vulnerability
A main effect of Stressor-Phase was found, F(1, 48) = 54.86, p <
0.0001, η2p = 0.53, demonstrating that the stressor task signifi-
cantly increased state anxiety levels from pre-stressor (mean =
39.32, SD = 10.48) to during-stressor (mean = 51.34, SD =
10.14). No other main or interaction effects reached statistical
significance, all ps> 0.32.
SECONDARY POST-HOC ANALYSES—TESTING THE EFFECT OF
BASELINE ATTENTION BIAS
Baseline bias as a dichotomous factor
Means and SDs of all baseline and post-training measurements
for baseline attenders and avoiders are presented in Table A1
(see appendix). The average baseline attention bias scores in the
attenders (12ms, SD = 9) and the avoiders (−18ms, SD = 12)
groups were each significantly different from zero, t(28) = 7.44,
p < 0.0001 and t(20) = −6.63, p < 0.0001, respectively. There
were no significant differences in baseline bias scores between
ABM and control participants neither in the attenders nor in
the avoiders groups (all ps > 0.6, for means and SDs see
Table 2).
Adding the baseline attention bias (toward or away from
threat) as a factor to all analyses produced two significant interac-
tion effects: first, when testing for effects of ABM on attention
bias using the dot-probe task, a Time-by-Baseline Bias inter-
action effect emerged, F(1, 46) = 24.27, p < 0.0001, η2p = 0.35.
Both participants who had an attention bias toward threat and
participants who had an attention bias away from threat at base-
line (means = 12.31 and −17.97, SDs = 8.91 and 12.42, respec-
tively) converged toward having no bias following ABM/Placebo
(means = 0.44 and −0.66, SDs = 18.43 and 15.13, respectively).
The second significant interaction was related to the effect
of ABM on stress vulnerability. STAI-S means and SDs before
and during the social stressor task are presented in Table 2.
There was a significant three-way Stressor-Phase-by-Group-by-
Baseline Bias interaction effect, F(1, 46) = 12.31, p < 0.001, η2p =
0.21. To explicate this interaction, two ANOVAs of Group
(ABM, placebo) by Stressor-Phase (pre-stressor, during-stressor)
were conducted, one for participants who had attention bias
away from threat at baseline (avoiders) and one for participants
who had attention bias toward threat at baseline (attenders).
For threat avoiders, those who received ABM showed larger ele-
vation in state anxiety in response to the stressor task relative
to their counterparts in the placebo training group. However,
this interaction was non-significant, F(1, 19) = 3.89, p = 0.063.
Table 2 | Means and SDs of baseline attention bias and state anxiety (STAI-S) pre- and during-stressor, for baseline attenders and avoiders by
training group.
Baseline attenders Baseline avoiders
ABM (N = 15) Placebo-Control (N = 14) ABM (N = 9) Placebo-Control (N = 12)
Baseline attention bias 12 (8) 13 (10) −19 (16) −17 (9)
STAI-S
Pre-Stressor 39.33 (7.91) 36.65 (8.26) 36.56 (13.55) 44.50 (12.27)
During-Stressor 47.60 (9.72) 54.71 (9.93) 53.57 (9.12) 50.42 (11.07)
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For threat attenders, however, a significant Stressor-Phase-by-
Group interaction effect was found, F(1, 27) = 10.36, p < 0.005,
η2p = 0.28. Follow-up contrasts indicated that both groups (ABM
and Placebo) showed significant increases in state anxiety from
before-to-during stressor, both ps < 0.001. Additional between-
group contrasts revealed that the two groups did not differ on
STAI-S scores before stress induction, t(27) = −0.89, p = 0.38.
Interestingly, the ABM group showed lower STAI-S scores rela-
tive to the placebo group during stress, t(27) = 1.95, p = 0.062.
This non-significant trend may suggest that among those who
attended toward threat at baseline, those who received ABM were
less vulnerable to the stressor (Figure 3).
Baseline bias as a continuous factor
The estimated coefficients and significance levels for the two
steps in the regression model are shown in Table 3. The overall
regression model significantly explained 31 percent of the vari-
ance in state anxiety change due to stress induction, F(3, 46) =
6.80, p < 0.001. This model explained significantly and substan-
tially more variance in stress-related anxiety change as com-
pared to the model considering only baseline attention bias and
group as single predictors, without taking into account their
interaction. Specifically, when not considering the interaction in
the model, ABM/Placebo Group did not predict state anxiety
FIGURE 3 | State Anxiety Scores (STAI-S) and standard error bars for
participants with baseline threat vigilance pre- and during the social
stressor task by attention training condition. ∗∗p < 0.0001; + p = 0.06.
change. Baseline attention bias predicted state anxiety change
at a trend level of significance with greater baseline threat bias
predicting greater elevations in state anxiety following stress
induction. Importantly, the interaction term between baseline
attention bias and ABM/Placebo group significantly predicted
state anxiety change. Follow-up simple slope analyses demon-
strated that for the Placebo-Control group the slope coefficient
was positive and significantly different from zero, B = 0.46,
t(24) = 4.55, p < 0.0001, suggesting that in this group, individ-
uals with greater attention bias to threat at baseline demon-
strated larger elevations of anxiety during the stress task. In
contrast, for the ABM group the slope coefficient was not signif-
icantly different from zero, B = −0.16, t(22) = −1.36, p > 0.15
(Figure 4).
The regression model predicting change in trait social anx-
iety (LSAS) from pre- to post-training was non-significant
(p > 0.8).
DISCUSSION
The present study is the first to report a randomized con-
trolled ABM trial using subliminally-presented stimuli in high
socially-anxious individuals. The aim of the study was to exam-
ine whether subliminal ABM training away from threat faces
FIGURE 4 | Simple slope analyses: the estimated change in state
anxiety from pre to during the stressor task, as a function of the
interaction between baseline attention bias and training group
(ABM/Placebo-control).
Table 3 | Estimated coefficients, standard errors, and 0.95 confidence intervals for predictors in the two steps of the regression model
predicting stressor-related anxiety change.
Predictor B SE t 95% CI R2 R2
Step 1 Baseline attention bias 0.15+ 0.09 1.74 −0.02 – 0.33 0.06
Training group −1.06 3.18 −0.34 −7.45 – 5.33
Step 2 Baseline attention bias 0.46** 0.11 4.27 0.24 – 0.67 0.31 0.25**
Training group −1.30 2.76 −0.47 −6.85 – 4.26
Baseline attention bias × Training group −0.61** 0.15 −4.04 −0.92 – −0.31
+p = 0.089; **p < 0.001. Training group = ABM/Placebo-control groups. B = unstandardized estimated coefficient. SE = standard error. CI = confidence interval.
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was effective in reducing levels of social anxiety and social
stress vulnerability in socially-anxious students. In our effort
to accomplish this aim, we relied on commonly used ABM
and attention bias measurement methods that have proved
effective in supraliminal ABM research in similar populations.
However, despite this methodological effort and in contrast
to our expectations, the subliminal ABM used in the current
study did not induce detectable change in threat-related atten-
tion, neither on the dot-probe task (near transfer) nor on
the affective spatial cueing task (far transfer). We were also
unable to find an effect of ABM on self-reported trait social
anxiety.
There are various potential explanations for the null-findings
which could be broadly classified into four general types: (a)
that subliminal ABM is inherently ineffective for changing pre-
conscious attention patterns in anxious individuals; (b) that
the specific subliminal ABM protocol used here was not effec-
tive in inducing the expected change in attention patterns;
(c) that subliminal ABM did in fact modify attentional pat-
terns, but our measurement precision failed to detect this
change; and (d) that subliminal attention processes are related
to anxiety only in a sub-group of socially anxious individ-
uals, those who demonstrate threat-related attention bias at
baseline. Because our sample as a whole did not demon-
strate a measureable attention bias toward subliminal threat at
baseline this possibility was tested in post-hoc analyses look-
ing at the role of baseline threat bias in anxiety reduction
as a function of ABM. The theoretical and practical implica-
tions of each of the above-listed options are distinct in impor-
tant ways. Next we discuss the implications of each of these
possibilities.
Subliminal ABM could be inherently ineffective in inducing
change in preconscious attention patterns because the relevant
neuro-cognitive mechanisms supporting this process might be
less malleable to change by ABM as compared to processes
occurring within perceptual awareness. Specifically, subliminal
threat detection typically involves sub-cortical structures such
as the amygdala, one of the core components in danger detec-
tion and evaluation (Ledoux, 2000; Amaral, 2002), whose func-
tion relies, at least in part, on automatic, rapid-responding
neural architecture (Ohman and Mineka, 2001; Ohman, 2005;
Adolphs and Spezio, 2006). If preconscious attention patterns
are indeed less malleable to change, two important conclu-
sions may be derived: practically, there may be no reason to
invest further efforts in subliminal ABM methods. Theoretically,
one may speculate that consistent failure to modify atten-
tional patterns using subliminal ABM is consistent with the
notion that modification of threat bias by ABM and the asso-
ciated reduction in anxiety are mediated by later processes of
attention control rather than by automatic attention capture
(Browning et al., 2010; Eldar and Bar-Haim, 2010; Heeren et al.,
2013).
A second possible explanation for the current null results
is that the specific subliminal ABM protocol used here was
not sufficiently effective to induce the expected change in
attention patterns. For example, it might be that trying to
change early preconscious processes using subliminal ABM
requires more training sessions, more trials per session,
different stimuli, or different masking procedure. If so, more
experimental research is needed to unveil these param-
eters that individually or together obscure the expected
effects.
Third, it may be considered that the subliminal ABM train-
ing did in fact influence attentional patterns, but our mea-
surement tools failed to detect this change. This could be
due to the relatively long time interval that elapsed from the
end of training to the post-training measurement of atten-
tion bias, or due to the effects of using subliminal stimuli.
For example, one may consider the possibility that consciously
perceived threat is necessary for ABM effects on attention to
surface in measurement. In supraliminal ABM protocols the
presence of threat stimuli is consciously perceived through-
out all assessment and practice sessions. In contrast, in the
current study conscious perception of threat never occurred
neither during training nor during threat bias assessments.
Future studies may consider measuring change in threat bias
using supraliminal presentations even when ABM is subliminally
delivered.
Finally, the finding of reduced stress vulnerability following
subliminal ABM in participants who demonstrated attention
bias toward threat at baseline may offer a clue that for a sub-
group of participants there was in fact some effect of sublimi-
nal ABM on stress vulnerability. This finding is in accord with
recently reported results from supraliminal ABM in patients diag-
nosed with general social phobia (Amir et al., 2011). In Amir
et al. (2011), patients in the ABM condition who had greater
threat bias at baseline displayed significantly larger reductions in
clinician-rated social anxiety symptoms relative to their coun-
terparts in the placebo condition. ABM did not differ from
placebo in patients who did not show threat bias at baseline.
These findings from Amir et al. (2011) and the present finding
are also in line with the basic rationale for ABM procedures.
That is, that pre-treatment threat bias is the target for ABM;
hence the absence of such bias might render ABM ineffective. A
similar rationale was offered in a randomized controlled ABM
study with clinically anxious children, which applied a base-
line bias toward threat as an inclusion criterion for participation
(Eldar et al., 2012). The current finding along with previous
results highlights the possibility that ABM procedures may be
beneficial to a specific sub-group of socially-anxious individu-
als characterized by attention bias toward threatening cues at
baseline. If proved reliable, such specificity in predicting treat-
ment efficacy may be ultimately applied to personalize anxiety
treatment. However, it is important to keep in mind that, at
least in the present study, this finding was part of a post-hoc
exploration and could be merely incidental. It is also impor-
tant to note that attention bias in both threat attenders and
threat avoiders converged toward zero at post-training, thus
could simply reflect regression to the mean. Future studies may
benefit from designs that specifically and a priori hypothesize
about the role of baseline threat bias in the clinical response
to ABM.
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Despite the discouraging findings with subliminal ABM
thus far, the potential of this intervention should not be
dismissed prematurely. If future studies could substantiate
evidence that subliminal training of threat-related attention
may have anxiolytic effects, it would point to the poten-
tial of ABM to target components of threat processing that
function outside perceptual awareness. Such specific processes
may occur independently and within different brain net-
works than processes activated by consciously-perceived threats
(Etkin et al., 2004; Li et al., 2007). Future studies may uti-
lize brain imaging techniques to directly examine and com-
pare the underlying neuro-cognitive mechanisms affected by
subliminal and supraliminal ABM. If indeed subliminal and
supraliminal ABM methods influence different neuro-cognitive
mechanisms related to anxiety, they may possess additive
therapeutic values, and may prove more efficient if deliv-
ered as a combined treatment procedure. This possibility
should be determined in future research directly comparing
subliminal ABM, supraliminal ABM, and a combination of
the two.
Interpretation of the results of the present study should be
considered in light of important limitations. First, the partic-
ipants in the present study were not clinically-diagnosed with
social phobia, but rather represent a sample of undergraduate
students who self-reported high levels of social anxiety. While
the use of analog populations typically provides an opportu-
nity to test preliminary treatment-related ideas, in the current
study it might have also limited the potential to detect anxiety-
related effects of subliminal ABM training. Future studies with
clinically-diagnosed populations could further test the efficacy
of subliminal ABM. Second, the present sample may not be
large enough to detect existing effects if these are relatively
small. It should be noted, however, that the detected effect of
subliminal ABM on social stress vulnerability within the threat-
attenders sub-group is quite robust considering the small sample
size. Third, the fact that attention bias toward subliminal threat
was not significantly different from zero in the current sam-
ple could be considered a limitation that may have hampered
the possibility to detect attentional and anxiety-related changes.
Considering the small-to-medium effect size of the threat bias
phenomenon in general, it is not uncommon that a single study
will not be able to find anxiety-related attention bias (Bar-Haim
et al., 2007). Furthermore, the effect is many times reported for
between group designs comparing anxious individuals to non-
anxious controls, while in the current study there were only
high-anxious participants. One way to probe this shortcoming
is to analyze the results referring to participants who actually
showed threat bias at baseline (as was done here using post-
hoc analyses). While these analyses seem to support the notion
that baseline threat bias may be important for ABM success,
caution should be taken in the interpretation of these post-hoc
findings, particularly those based on the dichotomous split to
attenders and avoiders. This particular analysis relied on very
small group sizes and also suffers from the possibility that some
group members may not truly deviate from zero bias. These
concerns may be alleviated to some extent by the supportive
findings relying on baseline attention bias as a continuous vari-
able in the regression analyses and should be explored in future
research.
In conclusion, the current study is mainly offering null results
of subliminal ABM, as we were unable to show direct effects of
subliminal ABM training on attention patterns or anxiety lev-
els. Nevertheless, we think it may be important for the ABM
research community to be exposed to these findings so that
both an open discussion of the issue could be advanced and
future studies could use this failure as a stepping stone for
their ABM designs. The current study is the first to report null
results for subliminal ABM conducted with an anxious popula-
tion and it corresponds with recently published null effects of
supraliminal ABM (Carlbring et al., 2012; Bunnell et al., 2013;
Neubauer et al., 2013). We hope that researchers would con-
tinue to share both null- and positive-findings concerning ABM
in order to advance understanding and experimentation in this
field. In the same vein, we also thought it is worthwhile to report
the post-hoc analyses suggesting that subliminal ABM training
may carry some potential to reduce social stress vulnerability,
and that baseline threat bias may serve as a marker for such
efficacy.
REFERENCES
Adolphs, R., and Spezio, M. (2006).
Role of the amygdala in processing
visual social stimuli. Prog. Brain Res.
156, 363–378. doi: 10.1016/S0079-
6123(06)56020-0
Amaral, D. G. (2002). The primate
amygdala and the neurobiology
of social behavior: implications
for understanding social anxiety.
Biol. Psychiatry 51, 11–17. doi:
10.1016/S0006-3223(01)01307-5
Amir, N., Beard, C., Taylor, C. T.,
Klumpp, H., Elias, J., Bums, M.,
et al. (2009). Attention training
in individuals with generalized
social phobia: a randomized
controlled trial. J. Consult. Clin.
Psychol. 77, 961–973. doi: 10.1037/
a0016685
Amir, N., Taylor, C. T., and Donohue,
M. C. (2011). Predictors of response
to an attention modification pro-
gram in generalized social pho-
bia. J. Consult. Clin. Psychol. 79,
533–541. doi: 10.1037/a0023808
Amir, N.,Weber, G., Beard, C., Bomyea,
J., and Taylor, C. T. (2008). The
effect of a single-session attention
modification program on response
to a public-speaking challenge
in socially anxious individuals.
J. Abnorm. Psychol. 117, 860–868.
doi: 10.1037/a0013445
Bar-Haim, Y. (2010). Research review:
attention bias modification (ABM):
a novel treatment for anxiety dis-
orders. J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry
51, 859–870. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-
7610.2010.02251.x
Bar-Haim, Y., Lamy, D., Pergamin,
L., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J.,
and Van Ijzendoorn, M. H. (2007).
Threat-related attentional bias in
anxious and nonanxious individu-
als: a meta-analytic study. Psychol.
Bull. 133, 1–24. doi: 10.1037/0033-
2909.133.1.1
Bar-Haim, Y., Morag, I., and Glickman,
S. (2011). Training anxious chil-
dren to disengage attention from
threat: a randomized controlled
trial. J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 52,
861–869. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-7610.
2011.02368.x
Beard, C. (2011). Cognitive bias mod-
ification for anxiety: current evi-
dence and future directions. Expert
Rev. Neurother. 11, 299–311. doi:
10.1586/ern.10.194
Browning, M., Holmes, E. A., and
Harmer, C. J. (2010). The modifi-
cation of attentional bias to emo-
tional information: a review of the
techniques, mechanisms, and rele-
vance to emotional disorders. Cogn.
Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 10, 8–20.
doi: 10.3758/CABN.10.1.8
Bunnell, B. E., Beidel, D. C., and
Mesa, F. (2013). A random-
ized trial of attention training
for generalized social phobia:
does attention training change
social behavior? Behav. Ther. doi:
10.1016/j.beth.2013.04.010. [Epub
ahead of print].
Carlbring, P., Apelstrand, M., Sehlin,
H., Amir, N., Rousseau, A.,
Hofmann, S. G., et al. (2012).
Internet-delivered attention bias
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 389 | 9
Maoz et al. Subliminal ABMT in social anxiety
modification training in individuals
with social anxiety disorder – a dou-
ble blind randomized controlled
trial. BMC Psychiatry 12:66. doi:
10.1186/1471-244X-12-66
Eldar, S., Apter, A., Lotan, D., Edgar,
K. P., Naim, R., Fox, N. A., et al.
(2012). Attention bias modification
treatment for pediatric anxiety
disorders: a randomized con-
trolled trial. Am. J. Psychiatry 169,
213–220. doi: 10.1176/appi.
ajp.2011.11060886
Eldar, S., and Bar-Haim, Y. (2010).
Neural plasticity in response to
attention training in anxiety.
Psychol. Med. 40, 667–677. doi:
10.1017/S0033291709990766
Eldar, S., Ricon, T., and Bar-Haim,
Y. (2008). Plasticity in atten-
tion: implications for stress
response in children. Behav.
Res. Ther. 46, 450–461. doi:
10.1016/j.brat.2008.01.012
Etkin, A., Klemenhagen, K. C.,
Dudman, J. T., Rogan, M. T.,
Hen, R., Kandel, E. R., et al.
(2004). Individual differences in
trait anxiety predict the response
of the basolateral amygdala to
unconsciously processed fearful
faces. Neuron 44, 1043–1055. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2004.12.006
Fox, E. (2002). Processing emotional
facial expressions: the role of anx-
iety and awareness. Cogn. Affect.
Behav. Neurosci. 2, 52–63. doi:
10.3758/CABN.2.1.52
Fox, E., Cahill, S., and Zougkou, K.
(2010). Preconscious process-
ing biases predict emotional
reactivity to stress. Biol.
Psychiatry 67, 371–377. doi:
10.1016/j.biopsych.2009.11.018
Fox, E., Russo, R., Bowles, R., and
Dutton, K. (2001). Do threatening
stimuli draw or hold visual atten-
tion in subclinical anxiety? J. Exp.
Psychol. Gen. 130, 681–700. doi:
10.1037/0096-3445.130.4.681
Fox, E., Russo, R., and Dutton,
K. (2002). Attentional bias for
threat: evidence for delayed disen-
gagement from emotional faces.
Cogn. Emot. 16, 355–379. doi:
10.1080/02699930143000527
Fresco, D. M., Coles, M. E., Heimberg,
R. G., Liebowitz, M. R., Hami,
S., Stein, M. B., et al. (2001). The
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale:
a comparison of the psychomet-
ric properties of self-report and
clinician-administered formats.
Psychol. Med. 31, 1025–1035. doi:
10.1017/S0033291701004056
Hakamata, Y., Lissek, S., Bar-Haim, Y.,
Britton, J. C., Fox, N. A., Leibenluft,
E., et al. (2010). Attention bias
modification treatment: a meta-
analysis toward the establishment
of novel treatment for anxiety.
Biol. Psychiatry 68, 982–990. doi:
10.1016/j.biopsych.2010.07.021
Hallion, L. S., and Ruscio, A. M.
(2011). A meta-analysis of the effect
of cognitive bias modification on
anxiety and depression. Psychol.
Bull. 137, 940–958. doi: 10.1037/
a0024355
Heeren, A., De Raedt, R., Koster, E.
H. W., and Philippot, P. (2013).
The (neuro)cognitive mechanisms
behind attention bias modifica-
tion in anxiety: proposals based
on theoretical accounts of atten-
tional bias. Front. Hum. Neurosci.
7:119. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.
00119
Heeren, A., Lievens, L., and Philippot,
P. (2011). How does attention
training work in social phobia:
disengagement from threat or
re-engagement to non-threat?
J. Anxiety Disord. 25, 1108–1115.
doi: 10.1016/j.janxdis.2011.08.001
Heeren, A., Reese, H. E., McNally, R. J.,
and Philippot, P. (2012). Attention
training toward and away from
threat in social phobia: effects
on subjective, behavioral, and
physiological measures of anxiety.
Behav. Res. Ther. 50, 30–39. doi:
10.1016/j.brat.2011.10.005
Klumpp, H., and Amir, N. (2010).
Preliminary study of attention
training to threat and neutral
faces on anxious reactivity to a
social stressor in social anxiety.
Cogn. Ther. Res. 34, 263–271. doi:
10.1007/s10608-009-9251-0
Koster, E. H. W., Fox, E., and MacLeod,
C. (2009). Introduction to the spe-
cial section on cognitive bias mod-
ification in emotional disorders.
J. Abnorm. Psychol. 118, 1–4. doi:
10.1037/a0014379
Ledoux, J. E. (2000). Emotion cir-
cuits in the brain. Annu. Rev.
Neurosci. 23, 155–184. doi:
10.1146/annurev.neuro.23.1.155
Levin, J. B., Maron, S., Gur, S.,
Wechter, D., and Hermesh, H.
(2002). Psychometric properties
and three proposed subscales of a
self-report version of the Liebowitz
Social Anxiety Scale translated
into Hebrew. Depress. Anxiety 16,
143–151. doi: 10.1002/da.10064
Li, W., Zinbarg, R. E., and Paller,
K. A. (2007). Trait anxiety mod-
ulates supraliminal and sublim-
inal threat: brain potential evi-
dence for early and late process-
ing influences. Cogn. Affect. Behav.
Neurosci. 7, 25–36. doi: 10.3758/
CABN.7.1.25
Liebowitz, M. R. (1987). Social phobia.
Mod. Probl. Pharmacopsychiatry 22,
141–173.
MacLeod, C., and Hagan, R. (1992).
Individual-differences in the
selective processing of threaten-
ing information, and emotional
responses to a stressful life event.
Behav. Res. Ther. 30, 151–161. doi:
10.1016/0005-7967(92)90138-7
MacLeod, C., Rutherford, E., Campbell,
L., Ebsworthy, G., and Holker,
L. (2002). Selective attention and
emotional vulnerability: assessing
the causal basis of their asso-
ciation through the experimental
manipulation of attentional bias.
J. Abnorm. Psychol. 111, 107–123.
doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.111.1.107
Mathews, A., and MacLeod, C. (1986).
Discrimination of threat cues with-
out awareness in anxiety-states.
J. Abnorm. Psychol. 95, 131–138.
doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.95.2.131
Mathews, A., and MacLeod, C.
(2002). Induced processing biases
have causal effects on anxiety.
Cogn. Emot. 16, 331–354. doi:
10.1080/02699930143000518
Matsumoto, D., and Ekman, P. (1988).
The Japanese and Caucasian Facial
Expressions of Emotion (JACFEE)
and Neutrals (JACNeuF) [CDs].
San Francisco, CA: Department
of Psychology, San Francisco State
University.
Mennin, D. S., Fresco, D. M.,
Heimberg, R. G., Schneier, F.
R., Davies, S. O., and Liebowitz,
M. R. (2002). Screening for social
anxiety disorder in the clinical
setting: using the Liebowitz Social
Anxiety Scale. J. Anxiety Disord. 16,
661–673. doi: 10.1016/S0887-6185
(02)00134-2
Merikle, P. M., Smilek, D., and
Eastwood, J. D. (2001). Perception
without awareness: perspectives
from cognitive psychology.
Cognition 79, 115–134. doi:
10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00126-8
Mogg, K., and Bradley, B. P. (2002).
Selective orienting of attention to
masked threat faces in social anxiety.
Behav. Res. Ther. 40, 1403–1414. doi:
10.1016/S0005-7967(02)00017-7
Mogg, K., Bradley, B. P., Williams,
R., and Mathews, A. (1993).
Subliminal processing of emo-
tional information in anxiety and
depression. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 102,
304–311. doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.
102.2.304
Mogg, K., Philippot, P., and Bradley,
B. P. (2004). Selective attention to
angry faces in clinical social phobia.
J. Abnorm. Psychol. 113, 160–165.
doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.113.1.160
Neubauer, K., Von Auer, M., Murray,
E., Petermann, F., Helbig-Lang, S.,
and Gerlach, A. L. (2013). Internet-
delivered attention modification
training as a treatment for social
phobia: a randomized controlled
trial. Behav. Res. Ther. 51, 87–97.
doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2012.10.006
Ohman, A. (2005). The rote of
the amygdala in human fear:




Ohman, A., and Mineka, S. (2001).
Fears, phobias, and preparedness:
toward an evolved module of fear
and fear learning. Psychol. Rev.
108, 483–522. doi: 10.1037/0033-
295X.108.3.483
Ohman, A., and Soares, J. J. F. (1994).
‘Unconscious anxiety’: phobic
responses to masked stimuli.
J. Abnorm. Psychol. 103, 231–240.
doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.103.2.231
Pishyar, R., Harris, L. M., and Menzies,
R. G. (2004). Attentional bias for
words and faces in social anxiety.
Anxiety Stress Coping 17, 23–36. doi:
10.1080/10615800310001601458
Posner, M. I. (1980). Orienting of atten-
tion.Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 32, 3–25. doi:
10.1080/00335558008248231
Rytwinski, N. K., Fresco, D. M.,
Heimberg, R. G., Coles, M. E.,
Liebowitz, M. R., Cissell, S., et al.
(2009). Screening for social anxiety
disorder with the self-report version
of the Liebowitz Social Anxiety
Scale. Depress. Anxiety 26, 34–38.
doi: 10.1002/da.20503
Schmidt, N. B., Richey, J. A., Buckner,
J. D., and Timpano, K. R. (2009).
Attention training for gener-
alized social anxiety disorder.
J. Abnorm. Psychol. 118, 5–14. doi:
10.1037/a0013643
See, J., MacLeod, C., and Bridle, R.
(2009). The reduction of anxiety
vulnerability through the modifica-
tion of attentional bias: a real-world
study using a home-based cogni-
tive bias modification procedure.
J. Abnorm. Psychol. 118, 65–75. doi:
10.1037/a0014377
Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L.,
Lushene, R., Vagg, P. R., and Jacobs,
G. A. (1983). Manual for the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory. Palo Alto,
CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Stormark, K. M., Nordby, H., and
Hugdahl, K. (1995). Attentional
shifts to emotionally charged
cues: behavioral and ERP data.
Cogn. Emot. 9, 507–523. doi:
10.1080/02699939508408978
Teichman, Y., and Melinic, H. (1979).
STAI and STAIC – Hebrew Guidlines
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 389 | 10
Maoz et al. Subliminal ABMT in social anxiety
for the Tester. Tel Aviv, Israel: Tel
Aviv University.
Tottenham, N., Tanaka, J. W., Leon, A.
C., McCarry, T., Nurse, M., Hare,
T. A., et al. (2009). The NimStim
set of facial expressions: judgments
from untrained research partici-
pants. Psychiatry Res. 168, 242–249.
doi: 10.1016/j.psychres.2008.
05.006
Tsunoda, T., Yoshino, A., Furusawa,
T., Miyazaki, M., Takahashi, Y.,
and Nomura, S. (2008). Social
anxiety predicts unconsciously
provoked emotional responses to
facial expression. Physiol. Behav. 93,
172–176. doi: 10.1016/j.physbeh.
2007.08.012
van den Hout, M., Tenney, N.,
Huygens, K., Merckelbach, H., and
Kindt, M. (1995). Responding to
subliminal threat cues is related to
trait anxiety and emotional vul-
nerability: a successful replication
of MacLeod and Hagan (1992).
Behav. Res. Ther. 33, 451–454.
doi: 10.1016/0005-7967(94)
00062-O
Waters, A. M., Mogg, K., and
Bradley, B. P. (2012). Direction
of threat attention bias predicts
treatment outcome in anxious
children receiving cognitive-
behavioural therapy. Behav.
Res. Ther. 50, 428–434. doi:
10.1016/j.brat.2012.03.006
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research
was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Received: 14 March 2013; accepted: 04
July 2013; published online: 23 July 2013.
Citation: Maoz K, Abend R, Fox NA,
Pine DS and Bar-Haim Y (2013)
Subliminal attention bias modification
training in socially anxious individu-
als. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:389. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2013.00389
Copyright © 2013 Maoz, Abend, Fox,
Pine and Bar-Haim. This is an open-
access article distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits use, distribution
and reproduction in other forums, pro-
vided the original authors and source
are credited and subject to any copy-
right notices concerning any third-party
graphics etc.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 389 | 11
Maoz et al. Subliminal ABMT in social anxiety
APPENDIX
Table A1 | Means and SDs of baseline, post-training, pre-stressor, and during-stressor measurements for baseline attenders and avoiders by
training group.
Baseline attenders Baseline avoiders
ABM Placebo-Control Total ABM Placebo-Control Total
(N = 15) (N = 14) (N = 29) (N = 9) (N = 12) (N = 21)
Gender (F/M) 12/3 12/2 24/5 8/1 8/4 16/5
Age 22.93 (1.83) 22.21 (1.31) 22.59 (1.62) 23 (2.24) 22.67 (1.37) 22.81 (1.75)
BASELINE MEASUREMENTS
LSAS score 54.60 (12.59) 58.71 (22.10) 56.59 (17.62) 54.78 (18.19) 52.75 (14.89) 53.62 (15.98)
STAI-S score 36.07 (7.25) 39.57 (7.94) 37.76 (7.66) 41.22 (15.00) 36.92 (7.99) 38.76 (11.39)
Dot-probe
Mean RT—threat 517 (65) 531 (40) 524 (54) 543 (61) 535 (56) 538 (57)
Mean RT—neutral 529 (66) 544 (45) 536 (56) 524 (48) 517 (54) 520 (50)
Threat bias score 11.54 (8) 13.13 (10) 12.31 (9) −18.96 (16) −17.22 (9) −17.97 (12)
Affective spatial cuing
Mean RT—threat valid 575 (100) 569 (69) 572 (85) 603 (80) 559 (70) 578 (76)
Mean RT—neutral valid 580 (105) 565 (69) 573 (88) 586 (79) 560 (74) 571 (75)
Mean RT—threat invalid 651 (129) 663 (90) 656 (110) 673 (103) 669 (111) 671 (105)
Mean RT—neutral invalid 671 (156) 656 (83) 664 (125) 682 (137) 674 (104) 677 (116)
Threat engagement 5.31 (23) −4.47 (20) 0.59 (22) −17.00 (14) 0.12 (24) −7.22 (22)
Threat disengagement −20.46 (43) 6.98 (44) −7.22 (44) −8.67 (70) −4.85 (37) −6.49 (52)
STRESS-RELATED MEASUREMENTS: STAI-S
Pre-stressor 39.33 (7.91) 36.65 (8.26) 38.04 (8.05) 36.56 (13.55) 44.50 (12.27) 41.09 (13.13)
During-stressor 47.60 (9.72) 54.71 (9.93) 51.03 (10.30) 53.57 (9.12) 50.42 (11.07) 51.77 (10.16)
POST-TRAINING MEASUREMENTS
LSAS Score 55.13 (17.89) 55.64 (23.19) 55.38 (20.24) 51.11 (15.77) 53.42 (19.76) 52.42 (17.77)
STAI-S score 33.60 (7.07) 36.07 (7.63) 34.79 (7.32) 36.23 (12.45) 41.42 (10.92) 39.20 (11.60)
Dot-probe
Mean RT—threat 470 (46) 470 (27) 470 (37) 491 (38) 470 (51) 479 (46)
Mean RT—neutral 471 (39) 470 (25) 470 (32) 491 (40) 468 (42) 478 (42)
Threat bias score 1.14 (20) −0.31 (18) 0.44 (18) 0.79 (14) −1.75 (16) −0.66 (15)
Affective spatial cuing
Mean RT—threat valid 544 (58) 543 (49) 544 (53) 575 (107) 541 (67) 556 (86)
Mean RT—neutral valid 546 (65) 545 (50) 545 (57) 582 (92) 539 (70) 557 (81)
Mean RT—threat invalid 622 (92) 634 (80) 628 (85) 658 (129) 660 (91) 659 (106)
Mean RT—neutral invalid 618 (90) 633 (69) 625 (79) 663 (119) 664 (109) 664 (111)
Threat engagement 1.47 (22) 1.09 (23) 1.29 (22) 7.12 (24) −2.33 (16) 1.72 (20)
Threat disengagement 4.41 (39) 1.48 (35) 2.99 (36) −5.37 (32) −3.51 (41) −4.31 (36)
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